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Lightweight and Privacy-Aware Fine-Grained
Access Control for IoT-oriented Smart Health
Jianfei Sun, Hu Xiong⇤, Ximeng Liu, Yinghui Zhang, Xuyun Nie, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—With the booming of Internet of Things (IoT),
smart health (s-health) is becoming an emerging and attractive
paradigm. It can provide accurate prediction of various diseases,
improve the quality of healthcare. Nevertheless, data security and
user privacy concerns still remain as issues to be addressed. As a
highly potential and prospective solution to secure IoT-oriented
s-health applications, ciphertext policy attribute based encryption
(CP-ABE) schemes raise challenges such as heavy overhead and
attribute privacy of the end users. To resolve these drawbacks,
an optimized vector transformation approach is first proposed to
efficiently transform the access policy and user attribute set into
respective vectors of shorter length while other approaches result
in redundant and longer vectors. Our transformation approach
can greatly relieve the costly overheard of key generation, encryp-
tion and decryption phases. Then, based on the transformation
approach and the offline/online computation technology, we
propose a lightweight policy-hiding CP-ABE scheme for the IoT-
oriented s-health application. With our proposed scheme, data
users in s-health system can perform lightweight encryption and
decryption without leaking any sensitive privacy about attributes
of the user. Finally, the formal security analysis, the theoretic
performance evaluation and experiment results indicate that the
solution is secure and efficient.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, smart health, privacy-aware,
policy-hiding, feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, Internet of Things (IoT) has gained broadacceptance and increased adoption in many aspects of
our daily life, ranging from healthcare, transportation, smart
home, smart city to smart environmental monitoring [1], [2].
IoT technologies render a competent and structured approach
to promote wellbeing of mankind especially in the healthcare
field [3], [4]. It is estimated that the healthcare sector will
be remodeled by IoT-based system. In modern healthcare
environment, IoT devices generally include wearable or em-
bedded smart devices and conventional sensors. These smart
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IoT devices implanted inside or worn on the wearer’s body
are leveraged in gathering the health data, such as pulse rate,
blood pressure, lung volume, temperature etc. In such way,
smart health records (SHRs) of the wearer can be created by
the collected data. For medical practitioners and healthcare
providers, SHRs are indispensable in providing accurate diag-
nosis and timely medical treatment. Commonly, this setting is
also known as IoT-oriented smart health (s-health) system [5],
[6] in literature.
In a typical s-health system, health data are universally gath-
ered from the wearable or embedded healthcare IoT devices
and then delivered to healthcare cloud server for remotely
sharing with medical practitioners and healthcare providers.
Due to the privacy-sensitive nature of the health data, many
concerns such as data privacy and security remain to be
addressed to facilitate this practical application [7], [8]. For
instance, patients expect that their SHRs can only be accessed
by the authorized medical doctors or healthcare providers.
Considering the semi-trusted nature of cloud (i.e., it honestly
performs the tasks for delegated data users but also attempts
to peek at the information privacy), encryption on privacy-
aware data prior to outsourcing is commonly regarded as a
straightforward approach to preserve data privacy. Whereas,
how to enforce fine-grained access privileges over the SHRs
remains a persistent challenge. Ciphertext policy attribute
based encryption (CP-ABE) [9], [10] is deemed to be a highly
promising solution to realize one-to-many encryption and fine-
grained access control over encrypted data. In the CP-ABE
scheme, access policy is attached to a ciphertext while secret
key is associated with the user attribute set. The data can be
accessed by data users in case the set of the user attributes
embedded in the secret key matches the access policy related
to the ciphertext.
Aside from empowering data providers (e.g., patients) to
designate the fine-grained access control over the encrypted
SHRs, protecting the attribute privacy of access policy is
also crucial in s-health system. By considering the fact that
the access policy in the standard CP-ABE is attached to a
ciphertext in the plaintext form, it is trivial for the adversary
to deduce some private information about the data provider
from the access policy. For example, in an s-health system, a
patient Alice encrypts her SHR data employing CP-ABE under
an access policy pol=(“City hospital”) AND (“Psychology
doctor” OR “Psychiatry doctor”). In this case, the SHR data
can only be accessed by a psychology doctor or a psychiatry
doctor in City hospital. Despite the SHR data is not accessed
by non-authorized users, the sensitive information of Alice can
be inferred by these users from the SHR ciphertext. Thus, the
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privacy of Alice is violated.
Hence, preventing illegal data users from snooping the
attribute privacy from access control raises another challenge.
Currently, variants of policy-hidden ABE schemes, i.e., partial
policy-hiding [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] and full policy-hiding
[18], [19], [16], [17], [20], [21], are used to impede the
privacy leakage from the access policy. In the partial policy
hiding CP-ABE scheme, only partial attribute values of access
policy are anonymized, whereas the access policy itself is still
in the plaintext form. For privacy-sensitive s-health system,
any leakages of attribute information of access policy may
seriously disgrace the privacy of data providers. Consequently,
it is significant to design a fully hidden policy CP-ABE scheme
that supports the whole attribute-hiding. This ensures that
private and sensitive attributes of the data providers in s-health
system are completely protected. With the goal of achieving
fully hidden policy that reveals nothing about user attributes
in access policy, based on hidden vector encryption [20], [21]
or inner product encryption [18], [19], [16], Phuong et al.
[17] put forward a CP-ABE scheme with fully hidden policy
by transforming the user attribute set and access policy into
respective vector sets. Only when the inner product of two
vector sets equals to zero, the attribute set can be used to
match the corresponding access policy. In this way, the private
information about the access policy is elegantly hidden in the
vector set.
However, there are some efficiency defects in their scheme,
such as the cumbersome computational tasks for the en-
cryption/decryption and prohibitive ciphertext size. To date,
protecting the privacy of the whole attributes, supporting fine-
grained and high-efficient access control as well as offering
lightweight encryption and decryption overhead still have not
been well-solved in literature.
Aiming to resolve these limitations afore-mentioned, a novel
approach to transform the access policy and user attribute
set into respective vector sets has been proposed to achieve
lightweight and privacy-aware fine-grained access control
based (LPAC-based) CP-ABE construction. Taking the IoT-
oriented s-health system as a use case, we simultaneously
tackle the issues of fine-gained and lightweight access policy,
online/offline encryption, whole attribute privacy protections.
The contributions of this paper are mainly concluded below:
• Fine-grained and optimized access policy. In LPAC-based
CP-ABE scheme, an optimized vector transformation
approach is proposed, which can transform the user
attributes and access policy into simpler attribute vector
and access vector, respectively. These attribute and access
vectors that will be used for key generation and ciphertext
generation contribute to lower computation and storage
cost in encryption and decryption phases. Thus, the smart
healthcare IoT devices can greatly relieve the bandwidth
and computation time in both ciphertext generation and
data recovery phases.
• Online/offline encryption. In LPAC-based CP-ABE
scheme, ciphertext generation is split into online and
offline phases. That is to say, most of computation-
intensive work to encrypt records before gaining the
records and access policy is completed in the offline
phase while only marginal operations are left to the online
phase [32]. To be more specific, the smart healthcare
IoT devices complete the offline phase when they have
adequate power sources and perform the online phase
without ongoing battery consumption. This can lower the
risks of the service availability.
• Stronger attribute privacy protection. Unlike prior
conventional CP-ABE schemes, LPAC-based CP-ABE
scheme can render data users with whole attribute privacy
protection by hiding the access policy. This can avoid
leaking privacy-sensitive attribute information.
• Lightweight decryption overhead. In the decryption
phase, LPAC-based CP-ABE has constant bilinear pairing
operations, which does not increase linearly with the
complexity of the specified access policy.
The detailed security proofs are also formally presented
to indicate that our LPAC-based CP-ABE scheme is selec-
tively secure under the asymmetric decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) problem and the P-asymmetric decisional
bilinear Diffie-Hellman (P-DBDH) problem in the standard
model. In addition, the experimental results from the com-
prehensive performance comparisons reveal that our LPAC-
based CP-ABE scheme is more practical and feasible for
IoT-oriented s-health systems. In next subsection, the related
literature is introduced.
A. Related Works
Many cryptographic primitives including identity based
encryption (IBE) only support a coarse-level access control
that severely limits the user’s ability to selectively share the
encrypted data at a fine-grained level. As a feasible solution,
attribute based encryption (ABE) [9], [10] was proposed to
enforce the expressive and fine-grained access control over
the data, such that only authorized users whose attributes
match the access policy can access the encrypted data. ABE
takes two various forms: Key policy ABE (KP-ABE) [9]
and Ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE)[10]. In a KP-ABE
scheme, each private key is labeled with an access structure
and ciphertexts are bound with a set of attributes. Contrarily,
in a CP-ABE scheme, each private key is associated with
a sets of attributes and an access policy is attached to the
ciphertexts. In many real-world scenarios, CP-ABE scheme
is more desirable than KP-ABE scheme since it empowers
data owners to autonomously select the access policy over
the data. In most existing ABE schemes, many CP-ABE
schemes have been suggested, mainly focusing on hierarchical
structure [25], efficient construction [15], [27] and security
[26]. However, the violations of attribute privacy are not
considered in these schemess. So, these traditional CP-ABE
schemes are inappropriate for privacy-sensitive applications,
like smart healthcare record systems (SHRs) [29], [30] and
electronic health record systems (EHRs) [28], [22], since the
access policy usually contains sensitive information.
To preserve the attribute privacy of users, many policy-
hiding CP-ABE schemes have been studied [11], [12], [17],
[13], [14], [15], [24], [23], [31], [29]. A CP-ABE scheme
supporting the property of hidden access structures is put
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forward by Nishide et al. [11]. In which, only partial attribute
values are anonymized, however anyone can learn the attribute
names. Soon after, several similar CP-ABE schemes with hid-
den policies were proposed in [14], [13], [15]. Specifically, the
schemes in [13], [14] are all proven secure under the composite
order groups and the scheme in [15] doesn’t support wildcard-
based AND gate access structure. Furthermore, these three
schemes have the similar privacy leakage issues as that in [11].
Li et al. [12] suggested a privacy-aware CP-ABE system that
can realize the policy hiding and wildcard-based AND gate,
whereas this scheme just can hide partial attributes of users and
be proven secure in the random oracle model. A policy-hiding
CP-ABE scheme was raised by Lai et al. [23], whereas this
scheme only supports partial policy-hiding under composite
order groups. Moreover, the decryption is inefficient since
the number of involved bilinear pairings increases linearly
with the complexity of access policy. Built from the scheme
[23], a novel partially policy-hiding CP-ABE scheme [29] is
recently suggested. Although it can render users with privacy
preserving of user attributes, the computation overheard of
decryption is still the same as that in [23]. Besides, it is
also constructed under composite order groups. The scheme
in [24] is constructed to support partially hidden policy under
prime order groups, whereas the scheme is also demonstrated
to be secure in the random oracle model. In addition, the
scheme in [24] cannot support wildcard-based AND gate and
its storage and computation cost is linear increasingly with
the complexity of access policy. Although privacy protections
of user attributes are provided in the above policy-hiding CP-
ABE schemes, these schemes just can support partial attribute-
hiding property instead of full attribute-hiding property. Thus,
it’s inappropriate for more privacy-sensitive s-health systems.
To resolve the issue of full attribute hiding, Yang et al.
[31] put forward a novel fully privacy-preserving CP-ABE
scheme based on Bloom Filter. However, the security proof
is not provided to formalize the attribute-hiding property. In
addition, Phuong et al. [17] also proposed a fully hidden policy
CP-ABE based on wildcard-based AND access control with
the technique of inner product encryption [18], [19], [16], [26],
however, the computation and storage overhead in encryption
and decryption phase increase linearly with complexity of
access policy. Further, the approach to generate the attribute
and access vectors used for key generation and ciphertext
generation is inefficient, which further results in high com-
putation and storage overhead. Motivated by considerations
of full attribute privacy protection, fine-grained and efficient
access policy as well as lightweight encryption and decryption
simultaneously in the IoT-oriented s-health system, a novel
LPAC-based CP-ABE that solves all limitations above urgently
requires to be proposed, which motivates this research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some cryptographic basic knowledge used in
LPAC-based CP-ABE is reviewed. Specifically, the definitions
of Viete formulas, AND and wildcard access control are
concluded below.
A. Viete Formulas
Let ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , v`) and ~u = (u1, u2, . . . , u`) stand for
two vectors, where the former vector contains both alphabets
(“ + ”, or “  ”) and wildcards (“ ⇤ ”) while the latter vector
only contains alphabets. A position set I = {i1, . . . , in} ⇢
{1, . . . , `} indicates the wildcards positions of ~v. Refer to the
above descriptions, the statement ((vi = ui) _ (vi = ⇤) for





















j , then the coefficients
aj can be easily created relied on set I . Thus, the equation














To hide the equations in (2), a group element Bi is
selected at random. When viewing vi, ui as Bi’s exponents,



















According to the derivation process of the Viete’s formulas,





ki1ki2 . . . kij , 0  j  n = |I|.
(4)
If taking set I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} as an instance, the poly-
nomial is then created as (i   i1)(i   i2)(i   i3)(i   i4),
therefore, we can derive the coefficient values as a4 = 1, a3 =
 (i1+i2+i3+i4), a2 = (i1i2+i1i3+i1i4+i2i3+i2i4+i3i4),
a1 =  (i1i2i3 + i1i2i4 + i1i3i4 + i2i3i4), a0 = i1i2i3i4.
B. AND-Gate and Wildcard Access Structure
Denote the universe of system attributes as A = {A1,
A2, . . . ,AL}, where each Ak, for k 2 {1, . . . ,L}, owns two
possible values, i.e., negative value “   ” and positive value
“+”. Each user in the system is bound with a set of attributes
U = {U1, . . . ,UL}, where each attribute Uk 2 {“ + ”, “  ”}
for i 2 {1, . . . , L}. Also, let W = {W 01, . . . ,W 0L} be an access
policy, where each W 0k 2 {“ + ”, “   ”, “ ⇤ ”}. The wildcard
“⇤” signifies that it does not make sense for the corresponding
attribute value irrespective of “ + ” or “  ”.
For instance, assume A = {A1 = “CS”,A2 = “SE”,A3 =
“Faculty”,A4 = “Student”}, where “CS” and “SE” stand
for computer science and software engineering, respectively.
Alice is a faculty who works in CS department. A student
Bob studies in SE department. Carol acts as a faculty who
works in both CS and SE departments. An access policy W1
could be matched by all SE faculties without working in the
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CS. Another access policy W2 could be contented by all CS
faculties and students excluding those in the SE. The above
user attributes and access policies are described in TABLE I.
TABLE I: User Attributes and Access Policies
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4
Description CS SE Faculty Student
Alice +   +  
Bob   +   +
Carol + + +  
W1   + +  
W2 +   ⇤ ⇤
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
For ease of following the concrete construction and security
of LPAC-based CP-ABE, the system model is first shown. The
threat & security models are then presented as the basis of
security analysis.
A. System Model
In the system model of LPAC-based CP-ABE, a IoT-
oriented smart health scenario is taken as an instance, which
involves four types of different entities: Trusted Authority,
Data Owner, Healthcare Server Cloud and Data Users in Fig.
1. Specifically, the trusted authority takes charge of the gener-
ation of public parameters for the entire system (step 1 ) and
the distribution of secret keys to data users (step 3 ). The data
owner (e.g. patient), who wears tiny wireless sensors or other
smart, gathers his/her related SHR information such as pulse
rate, blood pressure and lung volume via wireless protocols.
After that, the SHRs are encrypted and then transmitted via
the base station (step 2 ) to the cloud server for remotely
sharing with multiple authorized data users. When the data
user (like medical doctor or researcher) desires to know his/her
health condition, he/she requires to deliver his/her attributes to
trusted authority for secret key generation. After downloading
the SHR ciphertext, the data user then deciphers the SHR
ciphertext (step 4 ).
B. Threat & Security Model
In the threat model, the data owner and the authority are
assumed to be fully trusted. The healthcare cloud server is
considered as a semi-honest entity that can offer infinite stor-
age computing resources on demand to data users. That is, the
healthcare cloud server could render infinite amount of storage,
computing power and honestly perform the tasks for data users
but also attempts to snoop some sensitive information about
the stored data. Prior to introducing the formalized security
model, the formal definition of LPAC-based CP-ABE scheme
is defined in Supplemental Material A-A. Suppose that the
adversary A has a specified ability to launch attacks, the
security model is given to analyze the security of the LPAC-
based CP-ABE. Besides, the indistinguishability against the
selective chosen plaintext attack in LPAC-based CP-ABE is
introduced in Supplemental Material A-B
Base Station
























Fig. 1: An architecture of LPAC-based CP-ABE.
Algorithm 1 Previous Attribute and Access Vector Generation
Approach
Input: Given an access structure that contains at most `
wildcards (“*”), `+ positive attributes (“+”) and `  neg-
ative attributes (“-”); Given a set of user attributes U =
{U1, . . . ,UL}, where each attribute Ui 2 {“ + ”, “   ”}
for i 2 {1, . . . , L}.
Output: An access vector and two attribute vectors.
1: Positive, negative and wildcard symbols in an access
structure are first separated into three position sets J , K
and I;








j to derive coefficients
aj ;
4: end while




















11: Positive and negative symbols in a user attribute set are
also separated into two position sets J 0 and K 0;
12: for i = 1 to ` and i 2 J 0 do






15: for i = 1 to ` and i 2 K 0 do






18: Return access vector ~v = (a0, a1, . . . , an, 0n+1,




K), attribute vectors ~uJ0 = (u0, u1, . . . ,
u`, 1, 0) and ~uK0 = (u00, u01, . . . , u0`, 0, 1).
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Setup(1 ): This algorithm is performed by trusted authority. Based on a security parameter 1 , it randomly chooses an
asymmetric bilinear map group (G0,G1,G2, p, g, h, e) such that e : G0 ⇥G1 ! G2, where g, h are corresponding generators
of groups G0,G1 of the same prime order p. Also, it randomly picks ↵, ✓, , ⇢, ⌧1 . . . , ⌧n 2 Zp, computes g0 = g⇢, g1 =
g
↵
, g1,1 = g
⌧1
, . . . , g1,n = g
⌧n 2 G0 and h0 = h , h1 = h↵, h1,1 = h⌧1 , . . . , h1,n = h⌧n 2 G1. Finally, it outputs the
public parameter PP = (g, g0, g1, g1,1 . . . , g1,n, U = e(g, h )) 2 Gn+30 ⇥ G2 and holds the master secret key MSK =
(h, h0, h1, h1,1 . . . , h1,n) 2 Gn+31 securely.
KeyGen(PP,MSK, ~u): It is also executed by trusted authority. According to PP, MSK and an attribute vector ~u =









1 , sk2 = h
r1
, sk3 = h
s1
.
Offline.Encrypt (PP, W): This algorithm is pre-performed by data owner. Relied on PP and access policy W, it randomly
picks t, ⇢1, . . . , ⇢n 2 Zp and creates the offline ciphertext Off.CT and the access vector ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) as
Off.CT = (U t, gt, gt1,1g
 ⇢1









0, C1, {C1,i}i2[1,n], C2).
It finally stores intermediate result (Off.CT, t, ⇢1, . . . , ⇢n) and ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) for the online.encryption algorithm.
Online.Encrypt (PP,Off.CT,M,~v): This algorithm is also completed by data owner. Depended on PP, the plaintext message
M , the pre-stored offline parameter (Off.CT, t, ⇢1, . . . , ⇢n) and the access vector ~v = (v1, . . . , vn), it first computes C0 = M ·U t,
ei = ⇢i + tvi mod p and then generates the ciphertext CT = (C0, C1, C1,i, C2, e1, . . . , en).
Decrypt (PP,CT,SK): This algorithm is conducted by data user. Based on PP and SK = (sk1, sk2, sk3), it recovers the









and E1 = e(sk3, C2) 1e(sk1, C1).
Fig. 2: The concrete construction of LPAC-based CP-ABE
IV. OUR LPAC-BASED CP-ABE IN S-HEALTH SYSTEM
A. High Level of Attribute and Access Vector Generation
In this section, we discover an optimized vector transforma-
tion technique shown in Algorithm 2, which can efficiently
make a conversion from user attribute set and access policy to
attribute vector and access vector. Compared to the previous
vector transformation technique in Algorithm 1 introduced in
[17], our approach can generate a smaller number of attribute
vectors and access vector with shorter length, which will be
efficiently used for key generation and encryption. In [17],
the scheme is inefficient in terms of both computation and
communication cost. The basic reason of the defeats originates
from the fact that redundant information is embedded in
the vectors corresponding to the access policy and attribute
sets, and thus this kind of vectors will result in considerable
computation and communication overhead in key generation,
encryption and decryption phases.
Specifically, by observation of the process of attribute and
access vector generation in Algorithm 1, it is easy to observe
that since the sets J 0 and K 0 are mutually exclusive sets, only
one of them actually needs to be used for producing the at-
tribute vector. In other words, there is no need simultaneously
to produce two vectors ~uJ 0 and ~uK0 for key generation. As
shown in Algorithm 2, an optimized vector transformation
method is presented.
B. Our Concrete Construction of LPAC-based CP-ABE
With the goal of realizing LPAC-based attribute based en-
cryption, our main thought is to transform user attribute set and
access control into attribute vector and access vector. These
Algorithm 2 Optimized Attribute and Access Vector Genera-
tion Approach
Input: Given an access structure that contains at most `
wildcards (“*”), `+ positive attributes (“+”) and `  neg-
ative attributes (“-”); Given a set of user attributes U =
{U1, . . . ,UL}, where each attribute Ui 2 {“ + ”, “   ”}
for i 2 {1, . . . , L}.
Output: An access vector and an attribute vector.
1: Positive and wildcard symbols in an access structure only
need to be separated into two position sets J and I;








j to derive coefficients
aj ;
4: end while










8: Only positive symbols in a user attribute set are separated
into one position set J 0;
9: for i = 1 to ` and i 2 J 0 do






12: Return the access vector ~v = (a0, a1, . . . , an, 0n+1,
. . . , 0`,
Q
) and the attribute vector ~uJ 0 = (u0, u1, . . . ,
u`, 1).
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Electronic Science and Tech of China. Downloaded on April 08,2020 at 11:17:59 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
2327-4662 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2020.2974257, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal




 SHRs Ciphertext CT
Offline.Encryption(PP,W)
Online.Encryption(PP,Offline.CT,M,     )
(a) SHRs uploading
Decrypt (PP, CT,SK)









(b) Key distribution & SHRs accessing
Fig. 3: Protocol modules in s-health system.
vectors that will be correspondingly used for key generation
and ciphertext generation are more lightweight. Addition-
ally, to speed up the ciphertext generation, time-consuming
encryption preprocessing is performed, which leaves smart
devices with lightweight computation cost. In other words,
most of computation-intensive operations are completed in
the encryption preprocessing under offline mode. Our LPAC-
based CP-ABE consists of five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen,
Offline.Encrypt, Online.Encrypt and Decrypt. The concrete
construction of LPAC-based CP-ABE is presented in Fig. 2.
Remark: Our LPAC-based CP-ABE can largely offload
the computation-intensive burden on smart devices in s-health
scenario. Before key generation and ciphertext generation, the
attribute set and access policy are simplified into the simpler
attribute vector and access vector, respectively. Commonly,
simpler attribute vector and access vector that are used for key
generation and ciphertext generation mean lower computation
and storage cost. In addition, to further ease the computation
cost of ciphertext generation, in offline.Encrypt, most of
burdensome tasks are pre-completed when smart devices have
sufficient capacity and power. In Decrypt, data users can
quickly recover the plaintext message. Due to the lightweight
encryption and decryption, we will present how to extend
the LPAC-based CP-ABE in the s-health system in following
subsection.
C. Deployment of LPAC-based CP-ABE in IoT-oriented S-
Health System
In this section, LPAC-based CP-ABE is exploited as the
main building block to build an s-health system for smart
healthcare IoT devices. In detail, the s-health system also
comprises four types of entities: trusted system administra-
tor, patient, medical doctor/research, healthcare cloud server,
which is almost the same to Fig. 1. The trusted system
administrator works as the authority to take charge of the
generation of public parameters for the entire s-health system
and the distribution of secret keys to patients, doctors or
researches. The patient acts as the data provider who wears
tiny wireless sensors or other smart healthcare IoT devices,
which can continuously monitor and generate related SHR
information, such as pulse rate, blood pressure and lung
volume. After that, the SHRs are encrypted and transmitted to
the healthcare cloud server for remotely sharing with multiple
authorized data users. The medical doctor or researcher acts
as the healthcare provider decrypts the encrypted SHRs. Sub-
sequently, we present the protocol of LPAC-based CP-ABE
in IoT-oriented s-health scenario, which mainly involves three
protocol modules in Fig. 3: SHRs uploading, key distribution
and SHRs accessing.
In the SHRs uploading module (see Fig. 3(a)), the SHRs are
gathered from distinct smart devices via base station by the
data provider (refer to the patient), subsequently, the collected
SHRs are encrypted by performing Offline.Encrypt (PP,W)
and Online.Encrypt (PP,Off.CT,M,~v) in LPAC-based CP-
ABE. Finally, the SHRs encryptions are delivered to healthcare
cloud server for remotely sharing with healthcare provider.
Practically, to verify the fact that the delivered SHRs ciphertext
has been indeed received, the healthcare cloud server responds
an acknowledge message to data provider. Note that with
the patient’s TLS (Transport Layer Security) handshake, the
mutual authentication can be gained, which ensures that the
SHRs are sent by the patient and have been stored on target
healthcare cloud server.
In the key distribution module (see the right part of
Fig. 3(b)), the healthcare provider (refer to medical doc-
tor/researcher) sends his/her attribute set to the trusted ad-
ministrator, then the trusted administrator performs certificate
verification to ensure the healthcare provider’s legitimacy,
afterwards uses the vector transformation technique to convert
the attribute set into simpler attribute vector and finally call
KeyGen(PP,MSK, ~u) to create the secret key SK, which is
then transmitted to the healthcare provider via the security
channel (e.g. SSL, Secure Sockets Layer).
In the SHRs accessing module (see the left part of Fig.
3(b)), with the secret key SK, after downloading the SHRs
ciphertext CT = (C0, C1, C1,i, C2, e1, . . . , en), the healthcare
provider calls Decrypt (PP,CT,SK) to recover the SHRs.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Now, the security and performance of LPAC-based CP-ABE
are analyzed (Sections V-A and V-A, respectively). Due to the
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TABLE II: Attack-resistance ability comparisons of listed CP-ABE schemes
Scheme Replay attack User impersonation attack Denial-of-service attack User anonymity Collusion attack Man-in-the-middle attack
[11], [12] ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[13], [14] ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[15] ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[24] ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[23] ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[29] ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[31] ⇥ X ⇥ X X ⇥
[17] ⇥ X ⇥ X X ⇥
Ours X X X X X X
TABLE III: Comparisons of hidden policy CP-ABE schemes
Scheme Order Group Access Structure Hardness Assumption Asymmetric Pairing Wildcard Online/Offline encryption Full Privacy Awareness Standard Model
[11], [12] Prime AND-gates on multi-valued attributes DBDH+DLIN ⇥ X ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
[13], [14] Composite AND-gates on multi-valued attributes Subgroup Assumption X X ⇥ ⇥ X
[15] Prime LSSS Decisional (q-1) assumption+DLIN ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ X
[24] Prime AND-gates on multi-valued attributes n-BDHE ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
[23] Composite LSSS DBDH+DLIN X ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ X
[29] Composite LSSS DBDH+DLIN X ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ X
[31] Prime LSSS q-BDHE Assumption ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ X ⇥
[17] Prime AND-gates on +/- DBDH+DLIN ⇥ X ⇥ X X
Our scheme Prime AND-gates on +/- DBDH+P-DBDH X X X X X
TABLE IV: Performance comparisons of hidden policy CP-ABE schemes under prime order groups in the standard model
Scheme Public Parameter Size Secret Key Size Ciphertext Size Setup Cost KeyGen Cost Offline/Online Encryption Cost Decryption Cost
[17] (8n + 28)|G0|+|G2| (4n + 14)|G0| (4n + 14)|G0|+|G2| (8n + 27)Exp0+ Exp2 13(n + 3)Exp0  /(12n + 38)Exp0+Exp2 (4n + 14)Pair
Ours (n + 5)|G0|+|G2| 3|G1|+(n + 2)|Zp| (n + 4)|G0|+|G2|+(n + 2)|Zp| (n + 5)Exp0+Pair (n + 6)Exp0 (2n + 6)Exp0+Exp2 /0 3Pair+(n + 3)Exp1
space limitation, the correctness of LPAC-based CP-ABE is
omitted here.
A. Security Analysis
Provided that the selective security game similar to the
security game in [33] could not be breached by the adversary
A, then our LPAC-based CP-ABE can achieve the selective-
security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). The security
of LPAC-based CP-ABE can be ensured by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The LPAC-based CP-ABE scheme is said to
achieve the policy-hiding property and be selectively CPA-
secure in the standard model under the DBDH & P-DBDH
problems [33] shown in Supplemental Material A-C.
Proof: The detailed security proofs are shown in Supplemen-
tal Material B.
We also consider very few attacks in this section to show the
security strength of our scheme in IoT-oriented s-health system
against existing relevant attacks such as replay attack, user
impersonation attack, denial-of-service attack, user anonymity,
collusion attack, man-in-the-middle attack, etc.
As shown in TABLE II, we can observe that the works
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [24], [23], [29] neither resist
replay attack, denial-of-service attack and man-in-the-middle
attack, nor support user anonymity, while they are capable of
blocking both user impersonation attack and collusion attack.
The works [31], [17] are prone to suffering from replay
attack, denial-of-service attack, man-in-the-middle attack and
replay attack but support user anonymity, collusion-resistance
attack and user impersonation-resistance attack. Compared to
the above mentioned works, only our work has the ability
to defend replay attack, user impersonation attack, denial-of-
service attack, collusion attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and
considers the user anonymity. Specifically, in our IoT-oriented
s-health application, the certification verification and TSL
mutual authentication are correspondingly used for checking
whether the attributes of a healthcare provider are authenti-
cated by trusted authority and testing whether a data provider
is permitted within the specified timestamp to deliver the raw
data to cloud, which ensures that illegal users do not have any
ability to prove as a valid user to successfully send previously
used authentication messages during the authentication and
verification phases. As a consequence, our work can resist
replay and man-in-the middle attacks. Since the cloud server
only works as storing the data of data providers and any
non-authorization entity has no legal secret key, any non-
authorization entity cannot forge and send a valid decryption
request to derive the target data. So, user impersonation attack
is blocked in ours. Besides, the hiding-policy technique is used
to hide the specified attributes of access policy, which makes
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Electronic Science and Tech of China. Downloaded on April 08,2020 at 11:17:59 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
2327-4662 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2020.2974257, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal
that any users cannot derive any user attribute information
from access policy. Consequently, the user anonymity can
also be realized. As one of the principal security challenges
in all ABE works is to resist collusion attack, our work can
ensure that colluding attackers cannot decrypt the ciphertext
unless their own attribute sets satisfy the access policy of the
ciphertext. In addition, during the message transmission, the
acknowledge message as the authentication is used for mutual
successful authentication. If an attacker blocks the messages
from reaching a user and the cloud, the uses and cloud will
know about malicious dropping of such control messages.
Hence, the denial-of-service attack is prevented in our work.
B. Performance Analysis
In this section, previous related works supporting privacy
protection of user attributes [11], [12], [17], [13], [14], [15],
[24], [23], [29] are compared with our scheme in terms of
security model, access structure, hardness assumption and
other performance features. In table III, the comprehensive
comparisons are given according to important features con-
taining group type, wildcard, online/offline encryption, pairing
type, full privacy awareness, standard model. We denote linear
secret share scheme, decisional linear assumption and q-
bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent problem as LSSS, DLIN
assumption and q-BDHE problem, respectively. As presented
in table III, we can find that our scheme and the schemes
[13], [14], [23], [29] support asymmetric pairing operations
whereas the rest of other schemes [11], [12], [17], [15],
[24], [31] only support symmetric pair operations. Further,
in these schemes supporting asymmetric pairing operations,
only our scheme is online/offline construction based on prime
group. As well, we can also see that only our scheme and
the scheme [17] can render users with full privacy protection
while the remainder schemes can just support partial privacy
protection. In addition, we can conclude that only our scheme
and the schemes [13], [14], [17] are wildcard constructions
and secure in the standard model. In summary, according to
the above analyzing, only our LPAC-based CP-ABE scheme is
both wildcard construction and under prime group construction
while simultaneously achieving asymmetric pairing operation,
online/offline encryption, full privacy protection in the stan-
dard model.
Further, we exclude [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [24], [23],
[29] from comparisons because they cannot provide full pri-
vacy awareness and some of them are under composite order
constructions. In this way, we just make a quantitative analysis
for performance comparisons between the scheme [17] and our
scheme in table IV, where we represent public parameters,
secret key and ciphertext as PP, SK and CT, respectively. In
our experimental simulations, type A elliptic curve, as the
fastest pairing among all types of elliptic curves, is chosen to
implement the experiments. The curve expression E of type-
A curve is y2 = x3 + x over Fq finite field. Thus, the length
of one element in each group G0, G1 and target group G2
is set to 1024 bits and the length of one element in Zp is
set to 160 bits. Exp0, Exp1, Exp2 and Pair are exploited to
denote an exponentiation computation in G0, an exponenti-
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Fig. 4: Storage Cost Comparison of PP, SK and CT.
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(b) Key Generation Phase
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Fig. 5: Computation Cost Comparison of Different Phases.
G2 and a bilinear pairing computation, respectively. Let n
denote the number of wildcards in the access policy. It can
be seen in table IV that the public key size, secret key size
and ciphertext size in our scheme are much smaller than those
in [17] although these sizes in [17] and ours increase linearly
with the number of wildcards. Additionally, from table IV,
we can also find that our scheme completely outperforms the
scheme [17] respecting the size of the setup cost, the key
generation cost, the encryption cost and the decryption cost. To
sum up, our scheme has an excellent performance compared
to the scheme [17] with respect to the storage and computation
cost. For clarity, the comparisons of related sizes are presented
in Fig. 4(a), Fig. 4(b), Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 4(d), where we assume
that n is set to 5, 10, 15, 20, respectively for the convenience
of comparison.
To clearly present the performance comparisons, we conduct
experiments to evaluate the performance of ours and Phuong
et. al’s work [17] based on the latest JPBC library [34] for
underlying cryptographic operations. The configuration is as
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(a) Improvement in Storage Cost
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(b) Improvement in Computation
Cost
Fig. 6: Improvement in Storage and Computation Efficiency.
follows: All the experiments are compiled in the JAVA 8
language with the version of Intellij IDEA-2018.2.5, where
each user is replaced by a Huawei Android 6.0.1 phone
equipped with 3GB RAM, two-core 2.36GHz Cortex A73
processor and two-core Cortex A53 1.8 GHz processor. The “
Cloud ” is simulated with a Lenovo server which has Inter(R)
Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @3.60 GHz @3.60 GHz and 8GB
RAM, 512SSD, 1TB mechanical hard disk and runs on the
Windows 10 64 bits operating system.
In Fig. 5, we compare [17] with our scheme with regard
to the setup time, key generation time, the encryption time
and the decryption time. Specifically, the setup time, key
generation time, the encryption time and the decryption time
with the number of wildcard change in access policy are
correspondingly depicted in Fig. 5(a), Fig. 5(b), Fig. 5(c) and
Fig. 5(d). From Fig. 5, we can easily see that the computation
cost of each phase in our proposed scheme is much lower than
that in [17]. In Fig. 6, we present our improvement in storage
and computation efficiency compared to [17]. As shown in
Fig. 6, compared with [17], the saved storage cost ranges are
79.31% ⇠ 86.46%, 74.46% ⇠ 93.67%, 64.58% ⇠ 70.24%
respectively in terms of PP size, SK size and CT size.
The saved computation cost ranges are 74.71% ⇠ 84.42%,
84.62% ⇠ 90.48%, 83.34% ⇠ 83.84%, 67.33% ⇠ 81.48%,
respectively with respect to the Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and
Decrypt phases.
In conclusion, our LPAC-based CP-ABE scheme outper-
forms the existing schemes. Particularly, our scheme supports
more lightweight storage and computation cost while it en-
joys versatile properties presented in table III. Therefore, our
proposed scheme is more applicable for the s-health system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an optimized vector transformation approach
was suggested to efficiently transform the user attributes and
access policy into more succinct attribute vector and access
vector. Then, with this approach and the online/offline compu-
tation technology, we proposed a novel LPAC-based CP-ABE
scheme that was designed for IoT-oriented s-health system.
More specifically, our LPAC-based CP-ABE scheme supports
stronger attribute privacy protection, lightweight and fine-
grained access policy, online/offline encryption and efficient
decryption. The elaborated security proofs and performance
evaluation were presented to prove that LPAC-based CP-
ABE scheme gained selectively CPA security in the standard
model and was practical and efficient. One of our future
researches would be to build a fully policy-hiding CP-ABE
with fully CPA-security under prime order groups. On the
other hand, seeking attribute revocation, traceability and CCA-
based mechanisms based on our scheme are also considered
in our future work.
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